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Wearables and Personal Health Data
PUTTING A PREMIUM ON YOUR PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION
Imagine waking up in the morning—your Fitbit1 alarm
silently buzzing so you don’t oversleep. They know you had a
restless sleep. You get dressed and decide to walk to work.
They know where your office is located. So far, you burned
approximately 250 calories. They know you walked 4000 steps.
After work, you rush to the gym and get there just in time for
your favorite spin class. They know you entered Equinox at
7:20 p.m. After a full day, you haven’t reached your goal just
yet—15,000 steps. So, after dinner, you decide to take your dog
for a long walk until your Fitbit buzzes again, letting you know
you reached your goal. You are one step closer to living a
healthier lifestyle and they know it. But who are “they?”
Recently, insurance companies have gained greater
insight into their policyholders’ health habits by incentivizing
them to take steps toward a healthier lifestyle through the use
of wearable devices and health apps. Mobile health—
sometimes referred to as mHealth—applications (apps) have
increasingly provided new ways to track and collect personal
health data. These apps allow individuals to input personal
information including calorie intake, daily movements and
exercise, and even vitals.2 These platforms allow users to view
a more comprehensive picture of their personal health and, in
turn, take steps toward a healthier lifestyle. In recent years,
this technology has expanded to include wearable devices.
Wearable devices, also known as “wearables,” are
electronic technologies that are incorporated into items of
clothing or accessories, such as watches, glasses, and rings.3
1 A wearable device worn on an individual’s wrist that tracks an individual’s
daily movements and can act as an alarm clock—silently vibrating at a designated time.
See generally FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/sleep-better [https://perma.cc/A975-5QUV].
2 Jamie Lynn Flaherty, Note, Digital Diagnosis: Privacy and the Regulation
of Mobile Phone Health Applications, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 416, 421, 429 (2014).
3 “Generally, wearable technology will have some form of communications
capability and will allow the wearer access to information in real time. Data-input

1715

1716

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

This technology expands the capabilities of health apps by
collecting users’ physical activity such as “heart rate, skin
temperature, or respiratory rate . . . in real time” and
transmitting this collected data into the apps.4 Wearables
increase the efficiency and convenience of tracking biometric data
because the device itself can track and store this information
while the user simply wears it—even in water and during sleep
and exercise.5 Once the wearable collects data, the information
is sent wirelessly to a health app on a smartphone or computer,
or sent to the “cloud.”6 Users can then view a complete image of
their health by looking at their compiled data on a mobile app
via a smartphone or on a computer.
While wearable devices have been commonly used in
the medical field,7 recently there has been a sharp increase in
wearables that serve a more functional purpose—to
“recreationally track health and fitness levels.”8 For example,
a company called Fitbit Inc. sells a line of wearable fitnesstracking wristbands, or “Fitbits,”9 that track a user’s physical
activity while wearing the device, including the number of steps
taken, distance travelled, and calories burned. The device
includes a GPS monitor, a heart rate monitor, and an alarm10
and can even compile exercise summaries.11 Fitbit holds the
first spot in the wearables market, with Apple Inc. in the
number three spot.12 Fitbit sold 10.9 million devices in 2014
capabilities are also a feature of such devices, as is local storage.” Wearable Technology and
Wearable Devices Everything You Need to Know, WEARABLE DEVICES, http://www.wearable
devices.com/what-is-a-wearable-device/ [https://perma.cc/J45R-FFKG] (last updated Mar.
26, 2014).
4 Matthew R. Langley, Note, Hide Your Health: Addressing the New Privacy
Problem of Consumer Wearables, 103 GEO. L.J. 1641, 1644 (2015).
5 See id.
6 Ruby A. Zefo, Wearable Devices: Keep Data Privacy in Check, INFO. WEEK (Aug.
18, 2014), http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobile-devices/wearable-devices-keepdata-privacy-in-check/a/d-id/1298085 [https://perma.cc/288C-CNNB]. PC Mag defines “cloud
computing” as “storing and accessing data and programs over the Internet instead of your
computer’s hard drive. The cloud is just a metaphor for the Internet.” Eric Griffith, What
Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG. (May 3, 2016), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,
2372163,00.asp.
7 See, e.g., Spela Kosir, Wearables in Healthcare, WT (Apr. 15, 2015), https://
www.wearable-technologies.com/2015/04/wearables-in-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/2AGXGA6H].
8 Langley, supra note 4, at 1644.
9 FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/home [https://perma.cc/8RBG-2T8V].
10 See
Our Technology, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/technology [https://
perma.cc/87R3-EMG9].
11 SmartTrack, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/smarttrack [https://perma.cc/
8GYM-46EW].
12 Jeff Dunn, Fitbit is Still the Leader In Wearables, but It’s Losing Its Grip,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/fitbit-vs-apple-watchxiaomi-wearable-sales-chart-2017-3.
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and “sold 1.6 million in the first three months of 2015.”13 In the
third quarter of 2015 alone, the company sold 4.8 million
connected devices and raised $409.3 million in revenue.14 While
Fitbit sales have declined this past year due to interest in other
products, such as the Apple Watch or cheaper wearable
devices, the company shared its plan to “turn Fitbit into a
digital-health company—one that relies less on consumers and
focuses on selling to the health-care industry.”15
Since the release of the original Fitbit, there has been
a dramatic increase in wearable technologies and their
capabilities.16 Other types of wearable technology include
smartwatches,17 smart glasses,18 and smart shirts that track
biometric information.19 According to a recent report by Tractica,
a market intelligence firm, global revenue from wearable
devices is forecasted to reach $6.3 billion by 2020—a dramatic
increase from the “$218 million revenue in 2015.”20 The report
also predicts that over 75 million wearable devices will be sold
between the years 2014 and 2020.21
The market for these devices continues to grow and
even employers are implementing wellness programs using
these wearables to increase productivity and healthy habits
within the workforce. Now, insurance companies offer discounts
13 Brian Dolan, Fitbit Files for IPO, Sold Nearly 11 Million Fitness Devices in
2014, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (May 7, 2015), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/43412/fitbitfiles-for-ipo-sold-nearly-11-million-fitness-devices-in-2014 [https://perma.cc/M5FJ-U7LW].
14 Press Release, Fitbit, Fitbit Reports $409M Q315 Revenue; Raises Guidance
to $1.77 to $1.80B FY15 Revenue (Nov. 2, 2015), https://investor.fitbit.com/press/pressreleases/press-release-details/2015/Fitbit-Reports-409M-Q315-Revenue-Raises-Guidanceto-177-to-180B-FY15-Revenue/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/4LC5-JG7S].
15 Selina Wang, Fitbit’s Sales Plummet as Device’s Popularity Fades, BLOOMBERG
TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-22/fitbits-fourth-quarter-sales-drop-as-device-s-popularity-fades [https://perma.cc/W9TJ-9FVG].
16 See generally Martin Gee, A Day in the Life of Wearable Tech, TIME,
http://time.com/see-the-wearable-tech-of-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/QV6D-4KGE].
17 Tyler Biscontini, WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY, Salem Press Encyclopedia of
Science, (Jan. 2015) (“Smartwatches mimic the appearance of traditional watches,
featuring digital screens that display time and additional information. Most
smartwatches pair with a user’s smartphone, allowing the user to see messages or calls
on the watch that the phone has received. Some smartwatches are even capable of
taking pictures, sending messages, and making phone calls.”).
18 Id. (Smart glasses “use a translucent material placed in front of one or both
eyes to project a screen directly into the user’s field of vision. Most smart glasses
function by tracking the hand and eye movements of the users and syncing their
movements with the projected display. The glasses can function as a global positioning
system (GPS), access the Internet, and take hands-free videos and pictures.”).
19 Id.
20 Vera Gruessner, Wearable Devices Market Expected to Reach $6.3 Billion
by 2020, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 19, 2015), http://mhealthintelligence.com/
news/wearable-devices-market-expected-to-reach-6.3-billion-by-2020
[https://
perma.cc/M2H6-W43R].
21 Id.
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to policyholders who use Fitbits, or other wearable wristbands,
to track and report health information.22 At first glance, this idea
seems like a win-win for insurance companies and
policyholders—insurance companies can reduce risk by
encouraging healthier habits for their policyholders, and
policyholders can receive discounts on their health insurance.
Despite this synergy, however, this type of program threatens
personal privacy, particularly in the realm of health insurance,
because vast amounts of data are being collected and there is a
lack of clear regulation controlling the dispersion of this
information. Now, not only will health insurance providers gain
unrestricted access to an individual’s full health profile—which
may include information regarding an individual’s illnesses or
other conditions and influence the premium price or the
coverage status, but they will also have access to all of the
other information collected by these devices, such as the
location of the user at a given time. Even more threatening is
the fact that privacy regulations surrounding the collection—as
opposed to the dissemination—of this type of information is
less than sound, creating opportunities for third parties and
hackers to gain access to an individual’s personal health
information. While laws and regulations “protect” some of this
information by requiring companies to implement safeguards
and, in some states, to notify individuals of leaks or hacks,
these safeguards inadequately protect consumers from other
possible dangers.23
Due to the increased risks that go hand-in-hand with
technological advancements and increased data collection, the
United States should adopt new regulations to govern the
collection, storage, and dissemination of this information in
order to protect consumer privacy. In order to remedy privacy
threats posed by the collection and usage of information
gathered from wearables and other advancing technology,
particularly in the field of insurance, the law should require
insurance companies to inform policyholders of exactly what
data it collects and exactly how the data is used. More
specifically, the United States should adopt mandatory
regulations—mirroring that of the General Data Protection Law
(GDPR)—that require, rather than merely suggest, data
protections for the consumer.
22 See, e.g., Lucas Mearian, Insurance Company Now Offers Discounts—If You Let
It Track Your Fitbit, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.computerworld.com/
article/2911594/insurance-company-now-offers-discounts-if-you-let-it-track-your-fitbit.html
[https://perma.cc/9G72-VCUT].
23 See infra Section II.B.
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Part I of this note explores the general benefits and
consequences of wearables devices. Part II analyzes the current
laws that apply to the regulation of data collected by
wearables. It also discusses how these laws inadequately
address both the larger problem of underregulation of privacy
protection in the wearable context and the more specific
problem this note seeks to solve: insurance companies’ use of
wearable devices to track policyholder information. Finally,
Part III proposes that the United States adopt new regulations
governing data protection generally, modeled after the
regulations proposed by the European Commission in 2012.
The United States should adopt regulations that impose
safeguards on all personal data collection and processing in
order to protect consumers from the pervasiveness of electronic
devices. These regulations should, however, also leave room for
innovation and progress.
I.

THE GENERAL BENEFITS AND CONCERNS OF WEARABLE
DEVICE USAGE

Health apps and wearables introduce significant benefits
in terms of general health and personal convenience. Wearables,
especially those designed to track physical movement and
sleeping patterns, encourage healthy lifestyles. Problematically,
however, wearables also collect and store personal health
information that may not be safeguarded effectively.24
A.

The Benefits of Wearables

Health apps have numerous social benefits as a result of
the convergence between technology and healthcare. This
technology offers a form of “healthcare at a lower cost,”
increased patient control over personal healthcare, and “easier
and more immediate access” to healthcare information.25
Wearables—which allow a user to more closely track movement
and vitals—add to these benefits because they provide more
accurate tracking capabilities and quantify large amounts of
personal data: “The combination of ubiquitous use and
connectivity . . . together with Big Data and data mining plays

See infra Section I.B.
Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on Mobile Health,
Reconciling Technological Innovation with Data Protection, 1/2015, at 3 (May 21,
2015), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/15-05-21_mhealth_en_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3SQE-3E7M].
24

25
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a crucial role in mHealth, building a digital image of each of us
(so-called quantified self).”26
Fitness trackers such as Fitbits encourage healthy
behavior through their tracking capabilities.27 Fitbits—and
their health app counterparts—allow users to track their
sleep patterns and physical activity, analyze this data, and
set personal goals for movement and exercise throughout the
day. For example, with a Fitbit, a user can turn on silent
alarms, enter their calorie intake, and monitor logged health
data “such as blood pressure, heart rate, glucose readings,
and allergy severity.”28
Health apps and wearables have the ability to promote
healthy habits and cut healthcare costs because they provide
easy access to health resources and encourage users to live a
healthier lifestyle—even for those with more serious or chronic
conditions than an average user.29 This technology may reduce
hospital readmissions because patients are able to more
effectively self-monitor their own health.30 For example, apps
such as mySugr Diabetes Logbook allow individuals with
diabetes to monitor their glucose levels by tracking their sugar
intake and analyzing the inputted information.31 The app will
alert the user to changes in health and can even provide the
user’s doctor with reports.32 The accuracy and convenience of
these apps ultimately increase the likelihood that users will
seek preventative medical care and thus reduce hospital
admissions and readmissions.
Users of wearable devices likely utilize their app
counterparts because of convenience: “[wearables are]
increasing the popularity of apps over traditional web browsing
experiences.”33 Moreover, “[b]ecause wearable devices have
smaller screens and more intuitive interfaces, users will begin
26 Id. at 3. (citing Kelvin Kelly, founder of Wired, who established the
platform quantifiedself.com with journalist Gary Wolf, and introduced the concept to a
broader audience).
27 See Joanne Kaufman, I Have Miles to Go Before I Sleep: My Electronic Pal
Fitbit Urges Me on to Greater Lengths . . . and Heights, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303603904579496123006797640.
28 Jill Duffy, Fitbit Charge, PC MAG. (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.pcmag.com/
article2/0,2817,2473164,00.asp.
29 Flaherty, supra note 2, at 420. The availability of these resources promotes
healthier lifestyles and may “enabl[e] users to better manage chronic conditions.” Id.
30 Id.
31 MYSUGR, https://mysugr.com/apps/ [https://perma.cc/HE88-5TWU].
32 How to Use MySugr Logbook Reports, MYSUGR (Nov. 4, 2015), https://
mysugr.com/how-to-use-mysugr-logbook-reports/ [https://perma.cc/Y4BK-Q8VX].
33 Larry Alton, How Wearable Tech Could Spark a New Privacy Revolution,
CRUNCH NETWORK (Sept. 12, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/12/how-wearabletech-could-spark-a-new-privacy-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/VZC7-DMS5].

2017]

WEARABLES AND PERSONAL HEALTH DATA

1721

relying on apps over any other type of function or service.”34
The app counterparts allow users to view a complete health
profile in one place—either on their smartphone or on their
computer—so users can view their health profile almost
anywhere at anytime.
Wearable technology is not only limited to wristband
trackers like Fitbits, but also includes other technology with
tracking capabilities. One form of this sophisticated technology is
used in the sports arena. Professional sports teams use wearable
technology to track athletes’ health information and statistics.35
For example, the NFL partnered with Zebra technologies to
“collect data generated by radio-frequency identification
transmitters in the shoulder pads of the players.”36
The sensors capture precise location measurements in real time
during games, reportedly at a rate of about 25 times per second,
which translates into location tracking of every player within a
margin of error of about six inches for the duration of the entire
game. . . . Zebra’s MotionWorks server software processes the
information, and sends a variety of stats out to NFL’s broadcast
partners, as well as for use by the league’s other partners, and in its
NFL app and XboxOne.37

Several other leagues employ similar programs in order
to “enhance fan engagement[,] . . . reduce injuries and maximize
training.”38 These programs allow players and coaches to benefit
from an in-depth analysis of performance, which can help
monitor player fatigue and prevent injury.39 These statistics
have generated creative uses too: the statistical information can
be used in videogames, thereby providing fans with real
information and a more realistic experience.
Wearable devices also provide specific benefits depending
on the environment in which they are used. In the workplace,
wearables, aside from uses that increase productivity and
efficiency,40 can encourage employees to live a healthier lifestyle,
Id.
Brian Socolow, Wearable Tech Will Change Pro Sports—and Sports Law,
LAW360 (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/701415/wearable-tech-willchange-pro-sports-and-sports-law [https://perma.cc/2V2P-M7CM].
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. For example, the NBA uses technology to “track and analyze player
performance.” A sensor in the player’s jersey tracks the player’s speed, movement, and
position. Id. The data collected and the “hardware and software together allow teams
to look at biomedical data, including impact forces, turn rates and orientation, as well
as tactical information, such as two-dimensional animations of the play in real time or
post-practice.” Id.
39 Id.
40 Wearable devices can serve functions outside of health and fitness tracking
capabilities. For example,
34
35
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thereby reducing health-related costs.41 Some employers already
take advantage of this benefit.42 For example, Appirio—an
information technology consulting company43—implemented a
corporate wellness program in which it distributed 400 Fitbits
to employees throughout the company.44 Employees chose to
share some or all of the data collected on the device and the
company received a 5% discount from its insurer, Anthem,
after providing Anthem with the collected data.45 All parties
received a benefit from this program: the employees got free
Fitbits, the company received a discount on its insurance, and
the insurance company received the benefit that its
policyholders were presumably living healthier lifestyles,
thereby reducing overall risk and cost.46 Numerous other
employers have also implemented corporate wellness programs
utilizing the Fitbit. Tokyo Electron—a Japanese company that
manufactures semiconductors47—estimated that it would be
paying $3200 per employee per year if it had not implemented
a wellness program using the Fitbit.48 Also, Tokyo Electron’s

[i]n logistics and delivery, . . . parcel handlers may wear scanning devices
that offer “tactile feedback”—a short buzzing sensation—if the handler
misplaces a package. In the aircraft industry, heads-up displays (“HUDs”)
increase flight safety by improving the situational awareness of pilots during
bad weather conditions and night flights. And across industries, employees
who are constantly on their feet may be equipped with watches that allow
them to interface with a screen while remaining hands-free.
Christine E. Lyon, Going to the Heart of Workplace Health Programs and Apps,
LAW360 (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/704029/going-to-the-heart-ofworkplace-health-programs-and-apps [https://perma.cc/8G5N-AV9L].
41 Id.
42 In February 2014, Bates College implemented an employee wellness
program in which they distributed Fitbits to participating employees. James A. Martin,
Pros and Cons of Using Fitness Trackers for Employee Wellness, CIO (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.cio.com/article/2377723/it-strategy/pros-and-cons-of-using-fitness-trackers-foremployee-wellness.html [https://perma.cc/5PBQ-UJH3]. The college implemented an
eight-week competition among participating employees to encourage healthy living. Id.
“Employee wellness programs are the norm today. Nearly 80 percent of organizations
with more than 1,000 employees and 44 percent of firms with between 50 and 999
employees provide them, according to a 2012 survey by Automatic Data Processing.” Id.
43 APPIRIO, https://appirio.com/about/company-overview [https://perma.cc/
FXP3-S6JN].
44 Jonah Comstock, Employer Gets $280K Insurance Discount for Using Fitbits,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (July 15, 2014), http://mobihealthnews.com/34847/employer-gets280k-insurance-discount-for-using-fitbits/ [https://perma.cc/M49D-3XCQ].
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 See Business Portfolio, TOKYO ELECTRON, http://www.tel.com/about/portfolio/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/33FH-NSEY].
48 The company estimates that it would pay $15,000 per employee rather than
$11,800 per employee. Parmy Olson, Fitbit’s Game Plan for Making Your Company
Healthy, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2016/01/08/fitbitwearables-corporate-wellness/#796975d4527a [https://perma.cc/X339-VRTP].
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number of annual claims dropped from 11% in 2008 to 5% in
2016 due to this program.49
Insurance companies have also recognized these
adaptable benefits of wearables and found a way to integrate
wearables into individual policyholder plans independent of an
employer program.50 John Hancock, a health insurance
company, now offers discounts to policyholders who use Fitbit
wristbands to track and report their health information,51 and
other insurance companies are following in its footsteps.52
Insurance companies can greatly benefit from personal health
information gathered through wearables in order to better
assess policyholder health profiles. In general, insurance
companies use risk assessment in order to calculate premium
rates53 for their policyholders.54 Premium rates are calculated
based on mortality, or life expectancy, and the rate of interest
from investment of premiums.55 In terms of life insurance, a
person’s lifestyle will affect a user’s premium. For example, if a
user participates in “dangerous hobbies like skydiving,
mountain climbing or motorcycle riding,” her premium will
likely increase.56 Similarly, and more importantly in this
context, a user’s personal health status will greatly affect that
user’s premium because it provides a good indication of future
cost for the insurance company.57 In other words, the worse a
person’s health status or condition is, the higher the premium
because the insurance company must account for the greater
risk this individual presents.
In this way, data collected from wearable devices and the
accessibility of this information through the devices’ mobile app
counterparts allow insurance companies to easily assess their
Id.
Mearian, supra note 22; see also Jonah Comstock, One More Industry That
Wants Your Fitbit Data: Life Insurance, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://mobihealthnews.com/42210/one-more-industry-that-wants-your-health-data-lifeinsurance/ [https://perma.cc/8MGK-GHBV] (discussing how health insurance companies
have teamed up with wearable companies to implement wellness programs).
51 Tara Siegel Bernard, Giving Out Private Data for Discount in Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/your-money/giving-outprivate-data-for-discount-in-insurance.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XB5P-9Z49].
52 See infra Section II.A.
53 The cost for insurance per individual.
54 Finding
Insurance Insider Information: How Insurance Companies
Measure Risk, INSURANCE COS.COM, http://www.insurancecompanies.com/insiderinformation-how-insurance-companies-measure-risk/ [https://perma.cc/6HGE-MM2H].
55 Life Insurance Resource Center: How the Cost of Life Insurance Is
Determined, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., www.dfs.ny.gov/consumer/cli_h_cost.htm [https://
perma.cc/2LNU-PC8D].
56 Finding
Insurance Insider Information: How Insurance Companies
Measure Risk, supra note 54.
57 Id.
49
50
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policyholders and determine that future cost. This approach
appears innovative, efficient, and fascinating, but there are costs
to this type of monitoring by insurance companies.
B.

The Concerns of Wearables: Information Dissemination
and Data Protection

There are three major concerns that arise with the
increasing use of wearables: (1) the lack of safeguards
protecting personal health information, (2) the sharing of this
data to third parties, and (3) the threat of hackers obtaining
this information. In all apps, but in health apps particularly,
these concerns are more serious due to the breadth and
sensitivity of the shared information. Like other apps, health
apps collect data that is manually inputted by the user (i.e.,
information that the device does not necessarily track itself)
and automatically collect (e.g., purchase history), and share
this information with third parties such as advertisers and
data-collection agencies.58 But health apps also store personally
identifiable information such as heart rate, calories burned,
and sleep patterns. Moreover, the sensitive information
collected is subject to theft by hackers.59 Now, as the use of
wearables grows, privacy concerns surrounding the use of these
devices only expand. As companies increasingly use consumer
data in new and different ways, consumers face new types of
privacy threats.
The first major concern involves the type of data
collected. Many argue that health data is the most private form
of data that exists.60 Fitbit and other wearable devices track
physical movement, location, heart rate, dietary habits, and
other personal health information.61 While users voluntarily
input some data, they are likely unaware of other data that is
being collected.62 For example, a user may expect that their
See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
Emily Field, Biggest Privacy Problems in Fitness Trackers Still to Come,
LAW360 (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/686145/biggest-privacy-problemsin-fitness-trackers-still-to-come [https://perma.cc/SPN8-9JTW].
60 See Kelsey Munro, Data Collection: Wearable Fitness Device Information
Tracking Your Life, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/
digital-life/digital-life-news/data-collection-wearable-fitness-device-information-trackingyour-life-20150416-1mmzbq.html [https://perma.cc/R9WX-CH8W] (quoting David Vaile
from the Cyberspace Law and Policy Community at the University of New South Wales,
Sydney, who states, “[h]ealth data is the most sensitive of personal information”).
61 See supra Introduction.
62 “[A] user might assume that a fitness tracker will track number of steps,
heart rate, distance of a run, calories burned, and sleep patterns. But the user may not
anticipate that . . . many devices collect a great deal of other data.” Randi W. Singer &
58

59
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wearable collects information such as how many steps the user
takes or his or her sleeping pattern. But, a user may not be
aware that the wearable may be collecting other information,
such as “precise location data.”63 Also, mobile apps are “installed
on a device, and often running in the background,”64 meaning
that a user can exit out of an app without shutting down the
program and then resume using the app where they left off at a
later point in time.65 As a result of this, apps constantly collect
information about a user.66
The second major concern is where the information
being collected by wearable devices ends up. This information
can either be shared voluntarily or be obtained illegally. With
regard to the voluntary sharing of data, many companies sell
data obtained through their apps to third parties. Information
is sold to advertisers to use for “personally targeted ads,”67
which many users might expect. Or, the data collected may be
shared with insurance companies, financial institutions, and
employers.68 In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—the
nation’s consumer protection agency—conducted a study of
twelve mHealth and fitness apps and found that user
information was sent to seventy-six third-party companies.69 The
information sold to third parties included “[d]evice information;
[c]onsumer specific identifiers; [u]nique device IDs capable of
allowing 3rd parties to track users’ devices across apps; . . . and
[c]onsumer information such as exercise routine, dietary habits,
and symptom searches.”70 The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
(PRC)—a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting
consumer privacy71—also conducted a study that analyzed user

Adrian J. Perry, Wearables: The Well-Dressed Privacy Policy, 27 INTELLECTUAL PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 24, 24 (2015) (footnote omitted).
63 Id.
64 Alton, supra note 33.
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Field, supra note 59.
69 FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER GENERATED AND CONTROLLED HEALTH
DATA (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/195411/consumerhealth-data-webcast-slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV8S-6L7P].
70 Id; see Kristen Lee, Wearable Health Technology and HIPAA: What Is and Isn’t
Covered, TECH TARGET (July 2015), http://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/feature/Wearablehealth-technology-and-HIPAA-What-is-and-isnt-covered [https://perma.cc/CN3Z-XM8A].
71 About
the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, PRIVACYRIGHTS.ORG, https://
www.privacyrights.org/about
[https://perma.cc/92YY-ADNL].
The
Privacy
Rights
Clearinghouse is a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating consumers and advocating
for consumer rights. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/
[https://perma.cc/TXM6-VSHJ].
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privacy in health and fitness apps.72 The PRC concluded that
“information privacy is not currently a priority for developers of
mobile health and fitness applications.”73 The PRC study
highlighted the main issues regarding privacy risks: the
collection of data by advertisers, the collection of data by third
party analytics, and unencrypted network connections—which
lead to the threat of hackers.74
The third major concern is the vulnerability to hackers:
“Any device that has the ability to store data (i.e., iPod, MP3,
tablet, etc.) also has the ability to connect to a computer and,
thus, creates the potential for stolen data.”75 Unencrypted
network connections—connections not protected by a
password—only heighten this risk. According to the PRC study,
“only 53% of the free apps and 44% of the paid apps” transmitted
personally identifiable information (e.g., “name, email address,
address, geo-location, etc.”) using encryption or passwordprotection.76 While theft of any one piece of this information can
be damaging to a user, a real threat exists when hackers take
advantage of the amount of information stored in wearables
and engage in full identity theft. FTC Chairwoman Edith
Ramirez emphasized the danger of this due to a lack of data
security: “identity theft . . . has been the FTC’s top complaint
for the last 14 years. As the sheer volume of consumer data
grows, this issue will only take on added importance.”77
There are numerous other risks—both foreseeable and
unforeseeable—that go hand-in-hand with increased capabilities
in these types of technology, such as dangers that result from a
hacker’s ability to identify a user’s location. In an FTC report
released in January 2015 entitled “Internet of Things: Privacy
& Security in a Connected World” (the IoT Report) the FTC
noted that “unauthorized access to data collected by fitness and
other devices that track consumers’ location over time could
endanger consumers’ physical safety. Another possibility is
72 See LINDA ACKERMAN, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, MOBILE HEALTH
AND FITNESS APPLICATIONS AND INFORMATION PRIVACY: REPORT TO CALIFORNIA
CONSUMER PROTECTION FOUNDATION 3 (2013), https://www.privacyrights.org/mobile-

medical-apps-privacy-consumer-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK56-65YG].
73 Id. at 22.
74 Id. at 21.
75 Lorri
Freifeld,
Wearables
at
Work,
TRAINING
MAG.,
https://trainingmag.com/trgmag-article/wearables-work [https://perma.cc/8575-SK3N].
76 ACKERMAN, supra note 72, at 19–20 (providing that 43% of the twentythree free apps analyzed sold data to advertisers, while only one of twenty paid apps
analyzed sold to advertisers).
77 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Media
Institute (May 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
308421/140508mediainstitute.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH9Z-2PBQ].
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that a thief could remotely access data about energy usage
from smart meters to determine whether a homeowner is away
from home.”78 This information in the hands of a criminal
hacker could lead to harm to the person, property, or both.
While consumers generally view some forms of data
collection and usage as harmless (e.g., third party advertisers
who collect information for marketing purposes), other forms of
this data collection can have more serious implications. As
mentioned above, the collection of this data can have different
implications in the hands of employers, insurance providers, or
financial institutions. In the IoT Report, the FTC summarized
its findings after conducting numerous workshops.79 In one of
these workshops, Scott Peppet, a professor at the University of
Colorado Law School, addressed the new direction wearable
companies are heading regarding data collection: “Where are
they heading with the data? They are heading in a different
direction largely, although I’m sure advertising will also play a
role, they are heading towards really core economics or economic
functions. Things like credit worthiness, insurance,
employability, and the revelation of consumer preferences.”80
Paul Bond of Reed Smith LLP highlighted this same issue and
stated that the possibility of hackers is not “just a vague
concern. This information is used for stalking, assault and—at
some time, with respect to health information—this is
information that could be very interesting to potential
employers, insurers, people giving you credit.”81 Professor
Peppet highlighted that insurance companies can receive an
“incredibly detailed and rich picture” of a policyholder based on
data collected from wearables and that they can price
insurance premiums based on this data.82 So, while data
78 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 13 (2015).
79 Elizabeth A. Brown, The Fitbit Fault Line: Two Proposals to Protect Health
and Fitness Data at Work, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 33–34 (2016). See
infra Section II.B.3.
80 Transcript of Federal Trade Commission, Internet of Things Workshop at
169 (Nov. 19, 2013).
81 Field, supra note 59.
82 Peppet stated,

Why? Because these data coming off of sensors are incredibly high quality. I
can paint an incredibly detailed and rich picture of who you are based on
your Fitbit data or any of this other fitness and health data. And that data is
so high quality that I can do things like price insurance premiums or I could
probably evaluate your credit score incredibly accurately. The data are going
to move towards those economic purposes because they are so useful for that.
Transcript of Federal Trade Commission, Internet of Things Workshop, supra note
80, at 169.
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collection and its risks may seem daunting, in general, the
risks become particularly heightened in the context of wearable
devices and their new uses in the economy.
II.

PRIVACY ISSUES RELATING TO INSURANCE COMPANIES’
NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYHOLDERS

Wearable devices, generally, are not explicitly regulated
by a federal statute. As shown below, information gathered by
wearable devices may fall under certain legal frameworks
depending on who is collecting that information and how the
collecting entity uses the information. This creates two major
problems: (1) the sharing of information between parties
(particularly where insurance companies gather this type of
information and use it to deny coverage or raise premiums)
and, more broadly, (2) the lack of regulations governing
wearable devices.
A.

The John Hancock Program and Its Legal Problems

The use of wearable devices within the context of
insurance companies has its own particular benefits, but also
its own downfalls. In April 2015, John Hancock announced its
partnership with Vitality, “a service provider that integrates
wellness benefits with life insurance,” to offer discounts of up to
15% to policyholders who opt to wear internet-connected Fitbit
devices to track their exercise.83 John Hancock provides free
Fitbits to policyholders, and the Fitbit tracks activities that can
earn policyholders points.84 The program allows the
policyholders to receive discounts, gift cards, and discounted
hotel stays and airline fares in exchange for earning points for
physical activity, doctor visits, and participation in athletic
events.85 Michael Doughty, president of John Hancock
Insurance, believes the program will allow policyholders to
“connect their financial well-being to their long-term health.”86
Other insurance companies have since implemented similar
incentive programs.87 Oscar, a small insurance company, offered
83 Mearian, supra note 22; see Bernard, supra note 51 (discussing how the
John Hancock program works); Comstock, supra note 44.
84 Comstock, supra note 44.
85 Mearian, supra note 22.
86 Id.
87 One large insurance company, Cigna, offers Fitbits or Misfits (another
wristband wearable device) to consumers at a discounted price. Mara Lee, Insurers Offer
Cash, Discounts for Fitness Trackers, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 27, 2016), http://
www.courant.com/business/hc-aetna-apple-watch-20160927-story.html. The company
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policyholders a free Misfit—a wristband fitness tracker—and
one dollar for each day they reached their personal goals.88 Now,
members can simply use any fitness tracker that uses Apple
HealthKit—a mobile app—to track steps and receive their
dollar-per-day discount.89
These programs drastically change the way in which
insurance companies operate. For those who participate in the
program, pricing will no longer be based “on a detailed but
static snapshot of a person’s medical status,” but rather on an
individual’s health data that wearables collect on a continuous
basis.90 It also changes the insurance company into “less of a
passive vehicle that pays the bills if something happens, into a
more active vehicle to get people to lower their risk.”91
The program has many benefits—the most obvious being
the insurance company’s role in “proactively encourag[ing]
healthy behaviors” to allow policyholders’ insurance payments
to pay out over their lifetimes.92 In addition to the various
incentives given to consumers, these programs generally
incentivize policyholders to set health goals and take active

offers discounts on premiums and cash incentives for policyholders who partake in their
health coaching programs, which involve the use of wearables. Catherine Ho, Health
Insurers Take Steps to Fold Fitness Trackers into Business, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
(Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Health-insurers-take-steps-tofold-fitness-10907560.php [https://perma.cc/SN89-NMAW]. Other insurance companies
offer similar discounts to policyholders and employers involved in employee wellness
programs including Humana, United Healthcare, and Health Care Service Corporation.
Brian Eastwood, How Wearing Fitness Tracker Can Lower Your Insurance, TOM’S GUIDE
(July 28, 2016), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/fitness-trackers-insurance,news-23053.
html [https://perma.cc/U9VX-YF5M].
88 Steven Bertoni, Oscar Health Using Misfit Wearables to Reward Fit
Customers, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2014/
12/08/oscar-health-using-misfit-wearables-to-reward-fit-customers/#696d71da2574
[https://perma.cc/FQH9-87P2]; see OSCAR, IT’S A FITNESS TRACKER. AND IT’S FREE FOR
OSCAR MEMBERS, https://d3ul0st9g52g6o.cloudfront.net/All/All/info/MisfitOverview.pdf
?1425958173 [https://perma.cc/C8KC-86BD].
89 Jonah Comstock, MHN 2016: For Oscar, Step Tracking Is About Member
Engagement, Not Just Health, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (June 15, 2016), http://
www.mobihealthnews.com/content/mhn-2016-oscar-step-tracking-about-memberengagement-not-just-health [https://perma.cc/6HF9-8GMA]. Policyholders can receive
up to $100 per year in the form of an Amazon gift card. Id.
90 Bernard, supra note 51. John Hancock, in a news release, described the
potential savings: “For example, a 45 year old couple (of average heath) buying Protection
UL with Vitality life insurance policies of $500,000 each could potentially save more than
$25,000 on their premiums by the time they reach 85, with additional savings if they live
longer, assuming they reach gold status in all years.” John Hancock Introduces a Whole
New Approach to Life Insurance in the U.S. That Rewards Customers for Healthy Living,
PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/john-hancockintroduces-a-whole-new-approach-to-life-insurance-in-the-us-that-rewards-customers-forhealthy-living-300062461.html [https://perma.cc/5DDU-N7UG].
91 Comstock, supra note 44.
92 Id.
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steps toward achieving those goals.93 Participation in the
program gives policyholders an opportunity to potentially “save
more than $25,000 on their premiums by the time they reach
85.”94 The program also raises several concerns, however, with
regard to policyholder privacy. Like other insurance companies
that use incentive programs, John Hancock now has access to
policyholders’ day-to-day behaviors and exercise habits and can
even tell the moment policyholders arrive at their local gyms.95
According to John Hancock, the collected information will not
be sold to third parties, but the aggregate data “could be used
to inform the development of new insurance products.”96
This highlights a problem specific to insurance
companies and their relationship to policyholders. Typically,
when applying for individual life insurance, consumers are
required to get a medical evaluation by the insurer.97 In many
cases, a medical technician visits the policyholder’s home to
collect vital statistics as well as blood and urine samples.98 But
a life insurer typically does not have access to day-to-day
behavior.99 Now, these tracking capabilities—which may
someday include the ability to diagnose illnesses—present the
possibility that insurers will use information gathered from
Fitbits (or other wearables) to deny coverage or increase rates
for consumers.100
Professor Peppet explained that sensor data, the type of
data collected from wearables, is “incredibly hard to
anonymize.”101 This means that insurance companies can likely

Mearian, supra note 22.
Id.
95 See Bernard, supra note 51.
96 Id.
97 Rachel Emma Silverman, Need to Know: Life Insurance 101, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
15, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203633104576625394255572996.
98 Id.
99 Bernard highlights this exact issue, stating:
93
94

Of course, buying any life insurance policy requires customers to share detailed
medical histories upfront. But consumers participating in the Vitality program
must be comfortable providing enough information continuously to meet certain
thresholds that will convert into worthwhile savings. That might include the
frequency of workouts, reporting a physical exam or answering sensitive
personal questions: During the last 30 days, how often did you feel so nervous
that nothing could calm you down? Hopeless? Depressed?
Bernard, supra note 51.
100 See Andrew Boyd, Could Fitbit Data Be Used to Deny Health Coverage?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/
articles/2017-02-17/could-fitbit-data-be-used-to-deny-health-insurance-coverage
[https://perma.cc/AM5P-2TNQ].
101 Professor Peppet states,
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identify an individual simply from information collected from
their wearable.102 Professor Peppet also highlighted the lack of
transparency in the privacy policies of wearable devices: “[I]t is
just striking, when you go through the consumer experience,
how not salient it is that you are now about to generate a
massive amount of new, incredibly high value data that you’ve
never seen before.”103 This raises the issue of consent. How can
a consumer consent to giving away personal information if the
consumer is unaware of the information being offered?104
Finally, the Fitbit’s ability to track a policyholder’s
location presents a very real danger, one that most users would
likely find daunting. Location data can reveal where
policyholders go to the gym or where they are riding their
bikes, but it can also track where they sleep at night, where
they go during the day, and when they go to the restroom—
which may indicate particular health problems. This can
present a problem if a policyholder wears the device around the
clock because the location tracking may reveal patterns that
would suggest health conditions or personal circumstances that
the policyholders “would reasonably expect to be kept private.”105
These particular threats are inadequately addressed by the
current regulations surrounding both wearable devices and
privacy more generally.
B.

The Inadequacies of the Current Regulations Governing
Health Apps and Wearables

Currently, there is no federal statute governing privacy
in consumer wearables.106 It is also unclear what regulations
apply to this type of relationship between insurance companies,
Fitbit, and consumers. There are, however, other laws and
regulations governing personal data in particular fields, such as
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
It is just very unlikely that you and I have similar Fitbit data coming off of
our Fitbits. Why? Because I move completely differently than you do. Ira
Hunt, who is the CIO of the CIA said you can be 100 percent identified, as an
individual, by your Fibit data. Why? Because no two persons’ gaits or ways of
moving are the same. We can almost always figure out who you are based on
that kind of incredibly rich detail.
Transcript of Federal Trade Commission, Internet of Things Workshop, supra note 80,
at 170–71.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 171–72.
104 See infra Section II.B.1.
105 Lyon, supra note 40, at 10.
106 Langley, supra note 4, at 1642.

1732

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

(HIPAA) that governs patient health data. Government
agencies, including the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Food and Drug Administration, and the
Federal Trade Commission, generally play some role in
protecting consumers in the context of wearable devices and
health apps. Nevertheless, these agencies, and any promulgated
regulations, inadequately protect policyholders who participate
in the Hancock Program and consumers who will ultimately
participate in similar programs in the future.
1. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
oversees the most relevant regulation regarding individuals’
healthcare information: HIPAA. Congress passed HIPAA to
protect individuals, to increase portability when individuals
change jobs, and to combat waste and fraud.107 Under HIPAA,
covered entities, which include healthcare providers (doctors,
clinics), health plans (insurance companies, Health Maintenance
Organizations), and healthcare clearinghouses108 and their
business associates109 are required to protect “individually
identifiable health information,” otherwise known as “protected
health information” (PHI) under the statute.110 “Individually
identifiable health information” includes information related to
“the individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health
or condition, the provision of health care to the individual, or the
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to

107 See Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/
hipaa [https://perma.cc/RCD5-B7EL]; see also Health Information Privacy, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q9JT-9EL5].
108 Covered Entities and Business Associates, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/index.html [https://perma.cc/QW7T-5Y6J].
109 A business associate is defined as:

a person or entity that performs certain functions or activities that involve
the use or disclosure of protected health information on behalf of, or provides
services to, a covered entity. A member of the covered entity’s workforce is
not a business associate. A covered health care provider, health plan, or
health care clearinghouse can be a business associate of another covered
entity. The Privacy Rule lists some of the functions or activities, as well as
the particular services, that make a person or entity a business associate, if
the activity or service involves the use or disclosure of protected health
information.
Business Associates, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/
business-associates/index.html [https://perma.cc/628X-CNTY].
110 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/
ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html [https://perma.cc/FPL9-H68X].
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the individual.”111 For example, this includes a person’s “name,
address, birth date, [and] Social Security Number.”112
The HIPAA Privacy Rule113 was enacted in response to
the “rapid evolution of health information systems” as a result
of HIPAA.114 HIPAA established efficient means for healthcare
institutions to transmit information electronically.115 An
increase in the avenues of transferability of PHI created a fear of
misuse of that information and an increase in the danger of
harmful disclosures.116 The Privacy Rule responded to “the
challenges to the confidentiality of health information presented
by the increasing complexity of the health care industry, and by
advances in the health information systems technology and
communications.”117 Specifically, the Privacy Rule “sets limits
and conditions on the uses and disclosures that may be made of
such information without patient authorization. The Rule also
gives patients rights over their health information, including
rights to examine and obtain a copy of their health records, and
to request corrections.”118
Generally, HIPAA does not cover health and fitness
apps. But apps may be forced to comply with HIPAA where
they interact with health insurance companies or doctors.119
According to HIPAA, only “covered entities” and “protected
health information” are subject to the privacy requirements.
Since they are not included in the definition of “covered
entities,” most mHealth apps and wearables do not fall subject
to HIPAA’s regulations. But a health app will fall under
HIPAA if a covered entity uses the software.120 For example, a
111 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE 4 (2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf?language=es.l
[https://perma.cc/GPE7-K3C9].
112 Id.
113 45 C.F.R. § § 160, 164(A), 164(E) (2015). The rule, in part, reads “A covered
entity or business associate may not use or disclose protected health information,
except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this
subchapter.” Id. § 164.502(a).
114 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67
Fed. Reg. 53182, 53182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
115 Id.
116 Flaherty, supra note 2, at 416–17.
117 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67
Fed. Reg. at 53182.
118 The
HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/RKX8-ENAU].
119 Matt Fisher, Will the Hippo Swallow the Apple?, HITECH ANSWERS (June
12, 2014), http://www.hitechanswers.net/apples-health-app-healthkit-hipaa/ [https://
perma.cc/Q7VR-R3BA].
120 Adam
H. Greene, When HIPAA Applies to Mobile Applications,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (June 16 2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/11261/when-hipaa-appliesto-mobile-applications/ [https://perma.cc/5P2C-9LBS].
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health app that allows individuals to follow their medication
schedules or track their running distances would not fall under
HIPAA because there is no involvement by a covered entity.121
In contrast, a mobile app that health employees use in order to
obtain patient healthcare information would be regulated by
HIPAA because it involves a covered entity (a doctor) and
protected health information.122
HIPAA also fails to protect consumers from the more
acute problem of insurance companies receiving vast information
collected from wearables. Manufacturers of wearables are not
regulated by HIPAA either, so a company like Fitbit is not a
HIPAA covered entity because it is not a “health care provider,
health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse.”123 However,
companies like Fitbit may be regulated by HIPAA where a
covered entity is involved if, for example, health employees,
such as doctors, gave Fitbit direct access to patient healthcare
information (or if the company voluntarily becomes HIPAA
compliant).124 In other words, generally, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule does not govern information collected by companies like
Fitbit because they are not a “covered entity.”125 But, HIPAA
applies to insurance companies like John Hancock because
insurance companies are considered a “covered entity.”126
It seems like this HIPAA compliance solves both the
problem of the underregulation of wearable devices and the
more specific problem of the collection of consumer information
in an insurance company scheme. But it does not.127 The
general underregulation of wearables is not solved by HIPAA
because, more often than not, the companies collecting the
information (i.e., technology companies or employers) will not
be considered “covered entities” under the law. Moreover, even
if data collection and subsequent sharing of this information
constituted collection by a “covered entity” or its “business
associate” (e.g., collection by John Hancock or other insurance
companies) there are further restrictions to the type of data
covered under this law; HIPAA protection only applies to
Id.
Id.
123 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2015); Kristen Lee, Wearable Health Technology and
HIPAA: What Is and Isn’t Covered, TECHTARGET, http://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/
feature/Wearable-health-technology-and-HIPAA-What-is-and-isnt-covered [https://perma.cc/
9KR9-YF5N].
124 See infra, Section II.B.1.
125 Brown, supra note 79, at 24–26.
126 See generally id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra
note 111.
127 See infra, Section III.A.
121
122
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“individually identifiable data.”128 This means that “[w]hen
such data are aggregated for export and analysis, it arguably
loses HIPAA protection because it is no longer individually
identifiable.”129 Finally, the fact that HIPAA covers John
Hancock’s actions is not enough to prevent possible threats to
privacy in this context because the threat of John Hancock’s
misuse of this information still exists. For example, John
Hancock may use this information to take a deeper look into an
individual’s health profile. While a user may, on a surface level,
consent to this collection of information, an individual does not
necessarily consent to these hidden uses of the information. So,
even if HIPAA applies to the information in questions (i.e.,
Fitbit data collected by a health insurance provider), HIPAA
protections do not adequately protect consumers from all types
of privacy threats presented.130
Recently, the HHS also released tools to help clarify
which regulations apply to which mobile health products.131
While these guidelines likely help companies in determining
whether certain regulations apply to their product, the
guidelines do not protect wearable users if there are no
meaningful regulations protecting them in the first place.
2. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
responsible for regulating mobile health apps, including app
counterparts connected to wearables (e.g., the Fitbit app).132
The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act,
signed by President Obama in 2012, gives the FDA the power
to expand its authority and strengthen its ability to regulate
public health.133 The legislation therefore “allows the FDA to
keep creating mobile health regulations as well as speed up the
process of approving mHealth devices and apps.”134 Generally,
128

note 111.

See generally id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra

Brown, supra note 79, at 26.
See infra, Section III.A.1.
131 Resources for Mobile Health App Developers, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/developer-portal/ [https://perma.cc/VW3A-BQVT].
132 Vera Gruessner, FTC’s Role in Ensuring Data Security of Mobile Health
Apps, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 16, 2015), http://mhealthintelligence.com/news/ftcsrole-in-ensuring-data-security-of-mobile-health-apps [https://perma.cc/F5CH-FNMY].
133 Vera
Gruessner, Mobile Health Regulations Could Strengthen
Interoperability, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 9 2015), http://mhealthintelligence.com/
news/mobile-health-regulations-could-strengthen-interoperability
[https://perma.cc/
26G4-P6GK].
134 Id.
129

130
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however, FDA regulations focus on the “effectiveness and
accuracy of these devices and apps rather than the privacy
implications of their use.”135
In January 2015, the FDA released “Draft Guidance For
Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff” for Low
Risk Devices and released the finalized guidance on July 29,
2016.136 Essentially, the guidance suggested that the FDA “won’t
vigorously regulate devices as long as they’re not harmful and
generally encourage healthy habits.”137 For example, the
guidance stated that if a product is invasive, or “penetrates or
pierces the skin or mucous membranes of the body,” then the
product is not low risk.138 Since Fitbits do not physically
penetrate the skin, they are likely considered a low-risk device
and will not be rigorously regulated by the FDA. Device
makers, however, are calling for the FDA to make regulations
more explicit and it is unclear whether this approach will also
apply to wearables.139
Moreover, the FDA has broad jurisdiction over medical
“devices”140 through the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.141 The
act defines “device” to include instruments that are “intended
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions.”142 But
consumer wearables likely do not fall under this category
because they are not intended to treat “medical conditions”;

Brown, supra note 79, at 33.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL
WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2015); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2016) [hereinafter FDA Guidance].
137 Colin Lecher, The FDA Doesn’t Want to Regulate Wearables, and Device Makers
Want to Keep It That Way, VERGE (June 24, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/6/24/
8836049/fda-regulation-health-trackers-wearables-fitbit [https://perma.cc/VJV7-ZTZ8].
138 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 136, at 5 n.8.
139 Lecher, supra note 137.
140 Device is defined as,
135
136

an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro
reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or
accessory, which is—(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the
United States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use
in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and
which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action
within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon
being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012).
141 Id.
142 Id. § 321(h)(2).
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rather, they merely promote a healthy lifestyle, thus keeping
wearables out of the FDA’s jurisdiction.143
3. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has expressed
concern in the growing use of wearables and lack of privacy
laws governing the devices.144 The FTC monitors false claims
concerning mobile health apps (i.e., false claims that the device
can diagnose or cure illnesses).145 The FTC also monitors medical
data breaches by non-HIPAA covered entities.146 And while
“[FTC] guidance on what constitutes reasonable cybersecurity
measures isn’t particularly clear or helpful, according to
experts,”147 the Commission has recently focused on bringing
legal action against companies that endanger the safety of their
consumers’ private information.148
For example, since 2005, the FTC has brought
numerous suits “against companies with allegedly deficient
cybersecurity that failed to protect consumer data against
hackers.”149 While most of these cases settled, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals recently held in favor of the FTC in an
important ruling against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation.150
The FTC sued Wyndham pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which
prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”151 The FTC claimed that Wyndham violated this
provision because the company was hacked three times in 2008
and 2009; the hacks exposed personal and financial
information of hundreds of thousand consumers and led to

Langley, supra note 4, at 1649–50.
Gruessner, supra note 132.
145 Id.; see also Jessica Rich, Remarks at the NAD Annual Conference 2016, at 3
(Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/987463/
rich_-_nad_annual_conf_2016_remarks_9-26-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/88UM-U87C].
146 Gruessner, supra note 132; see also Complying with FTC’s Health Breach
Notification Rule, FTC (Apr. 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/
guidance/complying-ftcs-health-breach-notification-rule [https://perma.cc/4ZJ6-Y6FN]
(discussing the Health Breach Notification Rule issued by the FTC, which applies to nonHIPAA covered entities).
147 Field, supra note 59.
148 See Enforcing Privacy Promises, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises [https://perma
.cc/6XZ8-GPXC].
149 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015); see also
Jof Enriquez, FTC, FDA Countering Cybersecurity Risk of Wearable Devices, MED DEVICE
ONLINE (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.meddeviceonline.com/doc/ftc-fda-counteringcybersecurity-risk-of-wearable-devices-0001 [https://perma.cc/9KHT-U8X4].
150 See Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 240.
151 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
143
144
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$10.6 million in fraudulent charges.152 The FTC pointed to
numerous actions and omissions by Wyndham to support this
claim: Wyndham allowed its hotels to “store payment card
information in clear readable text,” used easily guessed
passwords to protect the systems, failed to use firewalls, failed
to “‘adequately restrict’ the access of third-party vendors to its
network and the servers of Wyndham-branded hotels,” failed to
“follow ‘proper incident response procedures’” in response to
hackers, and more.153
While the Third Circuit did not decide the case on the
merits, notably, this ruling explicitly stated that 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a) gives the FTC the authority to regulate cybersecurity.154
This ruling and the recognized power that the FTC has against
these unfair practices, however, only protect consumers from
one part of the problem—the threat of hackers. Moreover, the
FTC only has this enforcement power under the statute once
there is injury to a consumer. This type of reactive measure
does not adequately protect consumers from the more nuanced
threats they face.
Recently, the FTC also conducted workshops and
published reports that addressed threats to consumer privacy
in this context. In January 2015, the FTC released a report in
which it acknowledged the threats of unauthorized access to
information stored in wearable devices.155 The FTC has also
suggested new protections for consumer privacy,156 notably that
app developers should provide disclosures to users and obtain
consent from users when collecting “sensitive information.”157
In November 2015, the FTC conducted a workshop to examine
the privacy issues surrounding cross-device tracking.158 Crossdevice tracking involves linking data streams to connect an
individual’s devices and gather increasing amounts of

Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 240.
Id. at 241.
154 Id. at 240; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
155 Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World, Fed. Trade
Comm’n (2015) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-comm
ission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127
iotrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3KT-8EBD].
156 Flaherty, supra note 2, at 435.
157 FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST
THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 23 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-tradecommission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AT9-GHHY];
Flaherty, supra note 2, at 435.
158 See Cross-Device Tracking, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2015/11/cross-device-tracking [https://perma.cc/6BYY-K7QK].
152

153

2017]

WEARABLES AND PERSONAL HEALTH DATA

1739

information from that individual.159 FTC Chairwoman Ramirez
expressed concern over the amount of data that can be collected
from “cross-device” tracking.160 At the workshop, the FTC
expressed its continued efforts to protect consumers from these
risks.161 These suggestions inadequately regulate wearable
privacy because they merely suggest ways to protect consumers
rather than implement mandatory rules.
While the FTC is increasingly regulating company
activity in this area, these solutions merely react rather than
protect against threats because they impose liability on
companies for breaches after the fact of injury. Also, these
solutions fail to adequately address concerns of privacy in the
insurance context, particularly how insurance companies can
use data collected to assess a policyholder and possibly deny
coverage or raise premiums.

4. Additional Legal Frameworks
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) to provide privacy protections after
the fast-growing use of the internet: “The ECPA codified
protections for electronic communications and extended privacy
protections to e-mail and information stored by third parties.”162
Under the ECPA, it is a crime to intercept electronic
communications.163 However, the ECPA does not apply to
wearables because the act does not prevent disclosure of
customer records.164 Moreover, the ECPA “explicitly exempts
‘tracking devices,’ which it defines as ‘electronic or mechanical
device[s] which permits the tracking of the movement of a
person or object.’”165
The European Union (EU) has also expressed a growing
concern for the lack of privacy regulation governing devices in
the EU and worldwide.166 The European Data Protection
159 Kate Kaye, Cross-Device Tracking Creates New Level of Privacy Concerns,
FTC Says, ADAGE (Nov. 16, 2015), http://adage.com/article/datadriven-marketing/crossdevice-tracking-creates-new-privacy-concerns-ftc/301383/ [https://perma.cc/7F8Z-YFWD].
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Langley, supra note 4, at 1652 (citing Deirre K. Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2004)).
163 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
164 Langley, supra note 4, at 1652 (“Modernizing the ECPA could solve the
commercial wearable problem by including sensitive health data in its statutory
definition of content.”).
165 Brown, supra note 79, at 29–30.
166 See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on Mobile Health,
Reconciling Technological Innovation with Data Protection, supra note 25, at 2; see also
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Supervisor (EDPS), an independent, supervising authority
responsible for data protection in the EU,167 released an opinion
that expressed the following concern:
[I]t is necessary to protect individuals’ dignity and fundamental
rights, particularly those of privacy and data protection. The wide
use of Big Data can reduce users’ control over their personal
information. This is partly due to a huge unbalance between the
limited information available to people and the extensive
information available to entities which offer products involving the
processing of this personal information.168

The EDPS suggested that the legislature adopt
measures that require accountability in the design of these types
of products, and that app designers increase transparency in
relation to the use of user data.169 It suggested that the industry
promote innovation and use data collection to benefit
individuals rather than harm them, and the legislature enforce
stronger data security practices.170
The current statutory regimes are inadequate because
they either do not apply to the wearable context, or they simply
do not address the risks presented in situations similar to the
Hancock program. While personal privacy is not left completely
unregulated, different types of information are regulated under
different statutory frameworks, this causes a lack of uniformity
and, as shown in the case of wearables, a field of technology
that is left underregulated.
III.

NEW REGULATIONS ON DATA PRIVACY: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND PROTECTING PRIVACY

Striking a balance between technological advancement
and protection of consumer privacy can be difficult. Consumers
may overlook privacy implications in favor of fascination over
new developments and technologies. Privacy may be an
abstract term, but there is no doubt that most individuals
expect and value a certain degree of confidentiality when
sharing personal information.171 The lack of privacy regulations
governing health apps and wearables forces one to consider the
Frances Wheelahan et al., Mobile Apps That Collect Health Data: Will They Be Put Under
the Privacy Spotlight?, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=6f55c62e-6e9f-4a00-b16f-5536733ff672 [https://perma.cc/8VZT-86GU].
167 About, EDPS, https://edps.europa.eu/about-edps [https://perma.cc/SA73-5FQT].
168 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on Mobile Health,
Reconciling Technological Innovation with Data Protection, supra note 25, at 2.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
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implications of valuing the benefits of innovation and progress
over an individual’s right to privacy.
The Fourth Amendment affords individuals a right to
privacy.172 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
recognized an individual’s right to a reasonable expectation of
privacy.173 The court found that “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”174 While it is clear
from this case (and others) that the Constitution affords an
individual a reasonable expectation of privacy, this concept will
not apply where there are no government actors and where
individuals willingly give up their privacy. Consumers consent
to a certain amount of intrusion when they buy wearable
devices or sign up for insurance programs that utilize these
types of devices. Though, despite the lack of a Fourth
Amendment violation here, it is clear that the public expects a
certain amount of privacy, and it is unclear whether the public,
and consumers who directly buy into this industry, are actually
aware of what they are consenting to when they buy wearables
and when they take part in insurance programs.
Against this uncertain backdrop, Congress must proffer
an explicit solution to the ambiguity of privacy laws
surrounding wearables and the new economy of wearable data
information. More specifically, an applicable legal framework is
necessary to deal with insurance companies offering
policyholders wearable devices in exchange for discount
incentives. Many solutions have been proposed in regard to privacy
laws surrounding wearables in general. The trade-off of increased
regulations, however, is likely “decreased liberties—both for
individuals and corporations.”175 Some argue that, “personal
freedoms are more important than a fleeting idea of safety.”176

172

The Fourth Amendment reads,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
173 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
175 Alton, supra note 33.
176 Id.
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Alternatives That Miss the Mark

Many have argued for more explicit privacy regulations
surrounding wearables.177 Currently, the two most extreme
solutions—the crux of the privacy versus innovation debate—
are to either ban wearable usage altogether or leave the field
underregulated, as it presently stands. The People’s Liberation
Army, the armed force of the People’s Republic of China, has
already taken the former route by “ban[ning] the use of the
Apple Watch entirely.”178 This “act[] of censorship and routine
banishments of Western technologies [isn’t] exactly new, [but]
their take-no-chances stance reflects a very real, logical
concern.”179 Neither of these two options seems plausible in the
United States because banning these devices completely strips
individuals and businesses from participating in beneficial
health initiatives, and underregulation leaves consumers
vulnerable to privacy threats. Moreover, a complete ban
undermines this nation’s dedication “To Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”180 Proper regulation is required in order
for the law to reflect a preservation of a reasonable expectation of
privacy while also promoting innovativeness and efficiency.
In between these two extreme positions—banning
wearables altogether or leaving the area underregulated—lies
a myriad of possibilities such as amending current regulations
to apply to larger contexts, or relying on companies to properly
protect consumer information. But many of these proposed
alternatives miss the mark. None of these solutions solve both
the large-scale issue of underregulation, or the more discrete
issue created by schemes like the Hancock program.
1. Company Action to Ensure Customer Privacy
One way consumer data can be protected is through
company action. Companies and manufacturers know
consumers will not purchase their products if they do not have
a reasonable privacy policy.181 As a result, many companies are
177 See Alton, supra note 33; Carl Weinschenk, Security and Privacy Issues
Surround Wearables, IT BUS. EDGE (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.itbusinessedge.com/blogs/
data-and-telecom/security-and-privacy-issues-surround-wearables.html [https://perma.cc/
WX6A-MCMU]; see also Gruessner, supra note 133 (“[M]obile health regulations will
need to focus on patient data security and privacy in order to keep patients’ identities safe
and protected from data breaches or HIPAA violations.”).
178 Alton, supra note 33.
179 Id.
180 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
181 Field, supra note 59.
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changing their policies to reflect the desire for greater consumer
privacy.182 A policy of “transparency” may protect consumers
from the negative consequences of data collection: “[A]pp
developers can make greater efforts to secure their apps and
clearly explain their privacy policies. Device makers like Apple
and Google can go on record about the potential vulnerabilities
of their devices and inform the public about the best ways to
protect themselves.”183
Fitbit Inc. changed its privacy policy “to reassure users
that they don’t sell any identifying data.”184 On September 16,
2015, Fitbit announced that it “supports HIPAA compliance” in
efforts “to more effectively integrate with HIPAA-covered
entities, including corporate wellness partners, health plans and
self-insured employers.”185 The privacy policy promises its users
that Fitbit does not “sell data that could identify you to anyone,
anywhere, anytime” and that Fitbit “only share[s data] when you
tell us to, if we’re required to by law or to protect Fitbit.”186
These actions, while beneficial, fail to solve the larger
problem of underregulation in the wearable context because
not all wearable companies will opt into HIPAA compliance,
particularly if wearable companies send the information to
employers, financial institutions, or other entities that are not
considered “covered entities” under HIPAA. These actions by
Fitbit also fail to protect consumers from insurance companies
viewing their personal information and the risk that their data
may be exposed to hackers, because while Fitbit may not sell
consumer data, insurance companies that are given access to a
policyholder’s Fitbit data—pursuant to permission given by the
policyholder—will still have access and a full view of the
consumer’s personal information. The insurance company’s full
view of a patient’s Fitbit information can leave the consumer
open to hackers targeting the insurance company now.
Moreover, consumers will have new dangers to face, such as
the possibility that insurance companies will use the
information gathered improperly (i.e., to deny coverage or
increase their premiums).

Id.
Alton, supra note 33.
184 Field, supra note 59.
185 Press Release, Fitbit, Fitbit Extends Corporate Wellness Offering with
HIPAA Compliant Offerings (Sept. 16, 2015), https://investor.fitbit.com/files/doc_news/
Fitbit-Extends-Corporate-Wellness-Offering-with-HIPAA-Compliant-Capabilities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V23C-RA29].
186 Let’s Talk About Privacy, Publically, FITBIT (2017), http://www.fitbit.com/
privacy [https://perma.cc/7RS6-6TJH] (Fitbit privacy policy).
182
183
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2. Expand Existing Regulations
Another solution involves updating existing regulations
to include wearable devices—a technology that was not
foreseen by most of the laws regulating data protection today.
For example, Congress can simply update the ECPA to include
sensitive health data in its statutory definition of content and,
therefore, cover wearable devices. Any amendment should also
remove the exemption of “tracking devices” from the act’s
coverage.187 Congress could also amend HIPAA, which, as argued
above, likely already applies to insurance companies offering
policyholders discounts in exchange for information.188 This
solution would require companies like Fitbit to comply with
HIPAA regulations. Generally, this solution involves expanding
the definition of “covered entities” to include “employers, app
developers, and wearable device manufacturers.”189 In doing so,
these entities would be forced, under the law, to meet the
requirements of the Privacy Rule and other HIPAA provisions,
including rules that require these entities to take certain steps
to “ensure the confidentiality and integrity of electronic
personal health information” and “protect[ ] against the use[ ]
and disclosure of such information.”190
The argument for the expansion of HIPAA makes sense
considering the legislative history of the law. The HIPAA Privacy
Rule was enacted in response to the increase in healthcare
institutions’ ability to transfer information electronically.191 This
increase in the avenues of transferability of PHI created a fear of
misuse of that information.192 This is precisely the issue here. At
the time the Privacy Rule was enacted, it was likely hard for
legislators to imagine the expansion and use of wearables in the
healthcare industry today.
An expansion of HIPAA may mean expanding the
definition of covered entities to encompass a wider range of
entities.193 In other words, this would expand the regulation to
require more apps and devices to be HIPAA-compliant.194 This
solution would only address the broader privacy issues resulting
from a lack of regulations governing wearable devices, generally.
See Langley, supra note 4, at 1642–43, 1655 n.108.
Field, supra note 59.
189 Brown, supra note 79, at 46.
190 Id. at 46–47 (citing HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164(A), (E) (2003)).
191 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67
Fed. Reg. 53182, 53182 (Aug. 14, 2002).
192 Flaherty, supra note 2, at 417.
193 Id. at 418.
194 Id. at 436.
187

188
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An expansion of HIPAA will not be sufficient to address the
more discrete issue of personal health data being transferred
to insurance companies, however, because it is not a proactive
solution but rather a procedure that merely responds to
privacy breaches.
There are other consequences to consider in proposing
this solution. For example, an expansion of this regulation may
disincentivize app developers and device makers from
developing new, beneficial products because they will incur the
costs of implementing these new procedures and covering any
liability damages that may result.195 Additionally, HIPAA is
geared toward protecting consumers, rather than doctors or
wearable device creators, and an expansion of patient
protections may result in increased liability for doctors. For
instance, “some have suggested that doctors who recommend
certain privacy-exposing apps to their patients could be liable
for violating HIPAA.”196 Also, while the initial purpose of the
Privacy Rule was to respond to the increase in healthcare
institutions’ ability to transfer information electronically, the law
was not meant to address the ability of insurance companies to
make use of this information themselves (i.e., to view a full
picture of their policyholders health and other information).
In regard to the more discrete issue, even if HIPAA
already applies to John Hancock’s actions, consumers still face
the risk of data hackers and the internal uses of information
transferred to insurance providers. Also, while it is not within
the scope of this note, the extension of HIPAA alone fails to
solve other possible uses of this type of data collected from
wearables (e.g., in the employee-employer relationship).
3. Why Applying HIPAA Will Not Be Enough
Even where HIPAA applies, its application is not a
complete shield to the consequences of the expanding use of
wearables. According to the HHS, the HIPAA Privacy Rule:
[R]equires appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of personal
health information, and sets limits and conditions on the uses and
disclosures that may be made of such information without patient
authorization. The Rule also gives patients rights over their health

Id.
Id. (citing Sue Ter Maat, Health, Fitness Apps Pose HIPAA Risks for
Doctors, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.amednews.com/article/20130805/
business/130809993/7/ [https://perma.cc/5G4L-G62C]).
195
196
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information, including rights to examine and obtain a copy of their
health records, and to request corrections.197

In other words, HIPAA requires that personal health
information is protected and not shared, and provides
procedures in the case of data breaches. In many ways, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule does not protect the issue at hand here.
As a result of the program implemented by John Hancock, life
insurance companies will have access to a much larger image of
a policyholder’s personal health. Even if HIPAA applied in this
context, the Privacy Rule would not prohibit an insurance
company from viewing this full image of a policyholder’s health
information or from allowing insurance companies to track
other information unbeknown to policyholders.
In general, life insurers require a medical checkup and
are “increasingly checking hobbies, credit scores and driving
records—even, in some cases, web-surfing habits—to decide
who’s a risk and who’s not.”198 If that does not seem invasive
enough, an additional eye through a device worn on your arm
only increases this monitoring. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, if
explicitly extended to cover this activity, would not protect
consumers from the risks of handing their data over to their
insurer.199 Not only do consumers still face the threat of possible
hacks or breaches, but insurance companies may still use this
information to deny coverage or raise insurance premiums.
Despite the fact that HIPAA undoubtedly covers the
healthcare industry, a high number of HIPAA breaches has left
consumer information unprotected and subject to theft.200 There
have been 29.3 million HIPAA data breaches between 2009 and
February 2014.201 The number of these breaches increased
between 2012 and February 2014 by 138%.202 In 2013, 5447 out
of 90,000 data breach complaints to the HHS went
unresolved.203 These numbers do not even tell the full story, as
“[m]any healthcare breaches still go unreported” and “breaches
The HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 118.
Jilian Mincer, 10 Things Life Insurers Won’t Tell You, M ARKET WATCH
(June 30, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-life-insurers-wonttell-you-1308333194735 [https://perma.cc/934H-5AX4].
199 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 110.
200 Healthcare Security Breaches Cost $31B and Growing (Infographic),
HIT CONSULTANT (Sept. 15, 2015), http://hitconsultant.net/2015/09/15/healthcaresecurity-breaches-cost-31b/ [https://perma.cc/28MP-R8UW]; see also Erin McCann,
HIPAA Data Breaches Climb 138 Percent, H EALTHCARE IT NEWS (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hipaa-data-breaches-climb-138-percent
[https://perma.cc/A4Y2-73RW].
201 McCann, supra note 200.
202 Id.
203 Id.
197
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involving the health records of fewer than 500 individuals are
not required to be publicly reported.”204 These numbers show
that while HIPAA does instill safeguards for the consumer, the
regulation itself fails to adequately protect consumer privacy
information—the information is nonetheless subject to breach.
It is undeniable that as the use of wearables grows, both
within and outside of the healthcare field, the number of data
breaches will only increase unless there is a change. Data
breaches are essentially equivalent to having no privacy law at
all. In the end, consumer data is released. An expansion of
HIPAA’s definition of “covered entities” will not necessarily
protect against this threat.
IV.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD ADOPT REGULATIONS
MIRRORING THOSE OF THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION
REGULATION

A solution that completely dispenses with the option of
implementing programs similar to the Hancock program goes
too far by stripping individuals of their rights and hindering
innovation. As long as consumers consent to this type of
monitoring, it would be too limiting to forbid this type of
program. In fact, this type of program has numerous benefits
for a consenting, aware consumer. Even if HIPAA applies in
this context, however, insurance companies should be
restricted in terms of the type of data they collect and how they
utilize that data. At a minimum, insurance companies should
be required to tell users how they are using their information
and give users the option to control its usage and existence. In
the same vein, many have argued that new regulations are
necessary to reflect current privacy concerns, especially in the
digital age: “government organizations can step in to create
some much-needed regulations about user privacy and
corporate privacy policies.”205
The first step in providing consumers with data
protection in the context of the Hancock program, and similar
programs, is for insurance companies to inform policyholders of
exactly what data is being collected and exactly how that data
is being used. The FTC Chairwoman argued that, “companies
should only collect and keep information needed for a specific
business purpose.”206 The EDPS suggests similar implementation
204
205
206

Id.
Alton, supra note 33.
Ramirez, supra note 77, at 7.
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guidelines: “[t]he EDPS recommends improvements to security
requirements, ‘anonymisation’ techniques, greater accountability
of data-collectors and improved mechanisms for obtaining consent
where a person’s data will be used for historical, statistical or
scientific research.”207 Not only would mandatory security
requirements and data anonymization techniques reduce data
breaches and minimize the risk of hackers, but these rules
would also ensure that insurance companies inform
policyholders of exactly what data their Fitbits (or other
wearable) send them and how they are using that data to
calculate premiums. In this context, that would mean that
insurance companies, like John Hancock, would be required to
fully inform their policyholders. That way, consumers could
either knowingly consent to the collection and usage—or not.
The United States should adopt mandatory regulations
that mirror both the EDPS recommendations and the specific
provisions of the General Data Protection Law (GDPR)
anticipated by the European Commission. Specific provisions in
a single data protection law could afford adequate protections
to consumers who are unaware of how their data is being used.
The law could also require stronger data encryption
procedures, use of firewalls, and other mechanisms to ensure
the protection of consumer data and minimize the threat of
hackers and breaches. One standard of data protection law will
also solve the larger problem of the lack of regulation regarding
data collection from a federal level, thereby creating national
uniformity for data protection and combating future privacy
issues resulting from ever-increasing technological expansion.
In January 2012, the European Commission proposed a
unified data protection law, the GDPR,208 designed to
strengthen privacy rights in the mobile health field.209 Under
this new regulation, which was approved on April 14, 2016,210
principles and policy suggestions for data protections become
legal obligations rather than mere recommendations.211 Professor
Rotenberg and Professor Jacobs described the regulations as “the
natural evolution of the newest legal instrument to safeguard the

Wheelahan et al., supra note 166.
See European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, ch.I art.4, COM
(2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
209 Wheelahan et al., supra note 166.
210 GDPR Portal: Site Overview, EUGDPR, http://www.eugdpr.org/ [https://
perma.cc/2QCK-ZBPY].
211 Id.
207
208
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modern right to privacy.”212 The European Commission hopes that
this comprehensive reform of the 1995 EU Data Protection
Directive will “help reinforce consumer confidence in online
services, providing a much needed boost to growth, jobs and
innovation in Europe.”213
Specifically, the GDPR responds to two main problems
presented by the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995. First,
“the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995 did not adequately
address rapidly advancing technological developments.”214
“Second, the previous EU . . . regulations created a patchwork
of rules” that failed to protect individual privacy and failed to
provide uniformity that is necessary for business growth.215 An
adoption of regulations that mirror those of the GDPR would
allow the United States to respond to privacy issues related to
an increase in technology and also promote uniformity of data
protection laws throughout the country, across fields (e.g.,
health and telecommunications), and internationally.
In general, the GDPR protects the “personal
information” of “data subjects.” The proposal defines “data
subjects” as “an identified natural person or a natural person
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, by means
reasonably likely to be used” and defines “personal data” as “any
information relating to a data subject.”216 The broad definitions
of these terms allow the proposed regulation to provide
comprehensive protection of individuals, especially since it is
getting easier to identify individuals based on less
information.217 Similarly, this type of broad protection would
benefit the United States because the nation faces similar
privacy dangers that coincide with an increasing ability to
212 Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy:
The New Framework of the European Union, in PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 1557 (Anita
L. Allen & Marc Rotenberg eds., 3d ed. 2016).
213 European
Commission, Press Release 1P/21/46, The Commission,
Commission Proposes A Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to Increase
Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses at 1 (Jan. 25, 2012).
214 Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 212, at 1559.
215 Id. The 1995 Directive was just that—a directive. Therefore, this left
room for differing implementations in member states’ national laws. How Did We Get
Here?, EUGDPR, http://www.eugdpr.org/how-did-we-get-here-.html [https://perma.cc/
8YXV-YK65]. The new “Regulation will establish a single, pan-European law for data
protection, replacing the current inconsistent patchwork of national laws. Companies will
deal with one law, not 28.” European Commission Fact Sheet, Data Protection Day 2015:
Concluding the EU Data Protection Reform Essential for the Digital Single Market (Jan. 28,
2015).
216 Commission Proposal, supra note 208.
217 EUR. DIGITAL RIGHTS, KEY ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED GENERAL DATA
PROTECTION REGULATION EXPLAINED: WHAT ARE THEY? WHY ARE THEY IMPORTANT? WHAT
ARE COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS? WHAT CAN BE IMPROVED? 2, https://edri.org/files/GDPRkey-issues-explained.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GU7-4QWV].
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identify individuals based on less information. These broad
protections would clearly apply to policyholders of programs like
the Hancock program where the data being collected meets this
threshold, but it would also apply to other uses of wearables.218
“The GDPR is intended to strengthen consumer data
protection rights by facilitating individual control over personal
information.”219 Therefore, the GDPR requires that “the data
controller must obtain written, explicit consent” to collect data
on an individual.220 Under the proposed regulation, “implicit
consent” is impermissible and does not provide grounds for data
processing.221 Where a consumer gives explicit consent,222
however, a company can process the collected data for the
specified purpose. Moreover, the GDPR “grants substantive
rights to data subjects” where individuals have the right to
withdraw his or her consent at any time: “[t]he data subject will
be able to require a data collector to erase the data subject’s
information if there is no legitimate reason for retaining it.”223
The GDPR establishes that “[p]ersonal data must be[ ]
processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in
relation to the data subject.”224 This requirement codifies
recommendations previously proposed by U.S. government
entities225 and “requires data collectors to implement
transparent and easily accessible data processing policies,
which must be written in clear, plain language.”226 This
transparency provision allows individuals to understand the data
protections associated with their sharing of personal information.227

218
219
220
221
222

See supra Section I.A.
Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 212, at 1559.
Id.; see also Commission Proposal, supra note 208, at 21.
Commission Proposal, supra note 208, at 43.
The Proposal defines “explicit consent” as:

Consent should be given explicitly by any appropriate method enabling a
freely given specific and informed indication of the data subject’s wishes,
either by a statement or by a clear affirmative action by the data subject,
ensuring that individuals are aware that they give their consent to the
processing of personal data, including by ticking a box when visiting an
Internet website or by any other statement or conduct which clearly indicates
in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of
their personal data.
Id.

Id.; Rotenberg & Jacobs, supra note 212, at 1559.
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, ch.II art.5(a), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
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Also, the GDPR requires that data must be “collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.”228 A
“compatible” purpose would include, for example, processing
personal data for IT security.229 Incompatible purposes, however,
would include purposes not related to the initial purpose for
gathering the information, such as telecommunications data
retention in which the data is initially collected for billing and
further processed for law-enforcement use.230 This type of
regulation would ensure that data collection and data
processing remain narrowly tailored.
The proposal also requires that “personal data” be
“adequate, relevant, and limited to the minimum necessary in
relation to the purposes for which they are processed . . . ,
accurate and kept up to date,” and “kept in form which permits
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary
for the purposes for which the personal data are processed.”231
Moreover, personal data can only be processed if one of the
following applies: (1) the data subject consents; or the
processing is necessary, (2) “for the performance of a contract”
with the data subject, (3) to fulfill “a legal obligation,” (3) to
“protect the vital interests of the data subject,” (4) for the “public
interest,” or (5) for “legitimate interests” except where outweighed
by the interests or “fundamental rights” of the data subject.232
While many of the GDPR regulations mirror the EDPS
recommendations, the EDPS solution will likely not remedy the
risks of the Hancock program. As mentioned, the use of
wearables is only expanding. However, the EDPS’s
recommendation does not afford individuals their deserved
protection because it is a mere recommendation, not a
mandatory requirement. An adoption of regulations that mirror
those of the GDPR will ensure the preservation of individual
privacy, allow for business growth, and promote uniformity.
If the United States adopts regulations mirroring that of
the GDPR, these regulations will protect consumer privacy in
the context of programs such as that implemented by John
Hancock. The explicit consent requirement is the most
applicable and useful in the context of the Hancock program.
This type of provision would give consumers the protection
necessary to maintain their reasonable expectation of privacy
228
229
230
231
232
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because it provides them with full control of the information
that data collectors receive. Moreover, the provision still
affords companies the freedom to explore innovative avenues
that require data collection and processing by allowing the
collection and processing of data so long as consent is given.
The consent requirement is moot, however, without the
transparency requirement.
The “transparency principle” requires that insurance
companies and Fitbit remain transparent and disclose how the
collected data may be used. This requirement, combined with
the consent requirement, would allow individuals to make
educated decisions concerning the sharing of their personal
health information.
A provision in a general data protection law scheme that
requires data controllers to collect data for only a specific,
compatible purpose would also protect consumer rights. If
insurance companies collect information concerning policyholders’
health information for the purpose of calculating and creating
more specific policy costs and monitoring activities to give those
policyholders discounts, then the further processing of the data
for other uses would be illegal. This limitation on data collection
also reduces the threat that hackers present because it minimizes
the amount of information available about any one individual.
If a regulation resembling the GDPR is adopted, a
problem still may exist where policyholders who opt out of the
Hancock program will be at a disadvantage compared to those
policyholders who choose to provide personal health information
to insurance companies. Even policyholders who join the
program may be at a disadvantage if they choose to withhold
some of their information. Doughty explained that, “[y]ou do not
have to send us any data you are not comfortable with,” but the
“trade-off is you won’t get points for that.”233 With this type of
regulation in place, policyholders can choose for themselves
whether or not to provide Hancock with their personal
information and thereby receive a discount on their premium.
The explicit consent and transparency principle allows users to
make educated decisions on these matters. If consumers choose
not to explicitly consent to the data collection, they can rest
assured that their data will not be processed.
A regulation resembling the GDPR gives data subjects
substantive rights that would allow them to make informed
decisions regarding their personal privacy. Moreover, the
adoption of this type of regulation would allow the United
233
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States to create data protection privacy laws that establish
uniformity of the law both nationally and internationally.
CONCLUSION
In today’s world, the growing use of wearables presents
technological advances that many have only dreamt of. But the
use of these devices comes with risks. The current regulations
surrounding privacy and personal health information are
inadequate; they do not apply to the wearable-device context
and they fail to protect consumers from the risks of data
sharing and serious threats of hackers and data breaches.
These risks only increase as technology improves and the uses
of different technologies increase. This failure in the law
requires that the government adopt new laws to regulate this
industry more explicitly and stringently in order to protect
privacy rights of consumers and create uniformity in the law.
However, the government must also recognize the rights of
individuals to create, innovate, and even use this type of
technology. Insurance companies should be allowed to
implement this type of program as long as there is customer
consent and awareness. However, the government must
restrict the type of information insurance companies are
gathering and the manner in which these companies use,
share, and protect this information.
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